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Abstract 
This paper analyses the judicial application of New Zealand’s general anti-5 
tax avoidance rule contained in s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 2007 in the 
light of three 20
th
 Century jurisprudential theories of legal reasoning. It 
focuses specifically on the role of moral principles in the process of judicial 
decision-making and explores whether existing case law on the avoidance 
provision can be seen as supporting the hypothesis that judges apply moral 10 
principles when reaching decisions. Following the test laid down for tax 
avoidance in the Supreme Court’s decision in Ben Nevis Ventures Ltd & 
Others v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, the paper concludes that judges 
have the ability, in some cases, to reach their decision about whether there 
has been tax avoidance by applying the moral principle that tax should 15 
apply uniformly to all cases that are economically similar. 
Word Length 
The length of this paper (excluding table of contents, abstract, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises 14,980 words 
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Tax Avoidance in New Zealand: in Search of Principles 
I Introduction  
Large scale tax avoidance is becoming an increasingly prevalent problem 
for many countries. For example, HM Revenue and Customs department 
estimated that tax avoidance cost the  United Kingdom £5 billion in 2012.1 5 
Most countries have sought to combat tax avoidance by enacting both 
specific and general anti-avoidance rules. New Zealand’s general anti-
avoidance rule is found in s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 2007. The 
application of this section and its predecessors has frequently caused 
difficulty.  For example, judges have often been criticised for using this 10 
section to strike at tax arrangements that they do not like the feel of,
2
 or for 
applying the section in a way which goes beyond their judicial role to 
interpret the law.3  
This paper seeks to analyse the judicial interpretation of New Zealand’s 
anti-avoidance provision in the light of the leading 20th Century 15 
jurisprudential theories and of their application to judicial decision-making. 
It will focus specifically on the stance that each of these theories takes on 
the presence and importance of moral principles in judicial reasoning, and 
also assess which theory most accurately reflects the courts’ interpretation 
of s BG 1.   20 
The paper will first set out Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law and contrast 
it with two different theories of judicial reasoning; the first offered by HLA 
Hart and the second by the critical legal studies movement. Then it will look 
at whether judges explicitly reference moral principles in tax judgments and 
what they say about the relevance of moral principles to judicial reasoning. 25 
It will then compare the judgments to several judges’ extrajudicial writings 
about the process of judicial reasoning. The section will conclude by 
adopting the approach to judicial reasoning supported in the secondary 
literature; that is, that judges do use principles in decision-making, but only 
in some cases, and that the use of principles does not limit judicial 30 
discretion.  
                                                     
1 HMRC “Tackling Tax Avoidance” (Issue Briefing, London, September 2012). This 
amount accounts for 14% of the gap between the tax that is owned and the tax that is 
collected, which is estimated to be £35 billion. 
2 Eugene Trombitas “Comment: Trinity Exposed: Does the Emperor Really Have No 
Clothes or is He Wearing an Unusual Silver Rugby Jersey? The Latest News from the 
GAAR Front” (2007) 13 NZJTLP 583 at 591. 
3 See the statement of Lord Donovan in Mangin v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1971] 
NZLR 591 (PC) at 597. 
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Section two will focus more specifically on s BG 1. It will assess whether 
this is a provision which gives judges the scope for to apply principles when 
applying the section in their judgments and why this might be so. Section 
three will then examine two principles that scholars identify as underlying 
tax law and section four will look at common arguments made in relation to 5 
the provision and at whether these arguments reflect either of the identified 
principles. Section five will discuss whether there is still room for judges to 
be guided by moral principles when applying the avoidance provision 
following the Supreme Court’s first decision concerning s BG 1 in the 2008 
case Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd & Others v Commissioner of Inland 10 
Revenue.4 Finally, the paper will consider whether it is legitimate for judges 
to rely on moral principles in tax avoidance cases.  
II The Presence of Principles in Judicial Reasoning 
A Jurisprudential Theories: the Role of Principles  
Ronald Dworkin is often credited with making the morality of law 15 
something with which 20th century jurisprudence had to deal. Before 
Dworkin, the most widely accepted form of jurisprudential thought 
throughout the 20th century had been legal positivism. This theory of law 
holds that law does not necessarily have a moral element. Rather, legal 
thought and legal obligations can be separated and are distinct from 20 
morality. The theory of law laid down by Dworkin challenged this 
separation of law and morality. Dworkin argued that law and morality were 
intertwined because of the presence of moral principles in law. According to 
Dworkin’s theory, as well as the legal rules which are found in statute and 
common law doctrines, the legal system contains moral principles of justice 25 
and fairness.5 Dworkin addressed the impact of these principles on judicial 
decision-making when he laid out his process of reasoning. He argued that 
when a judge decides a case the judge must first identify possible 
interpretations of the law that fit existing law; that is, the interpretations of 
the statute that are consistent with both the words of the statute and with 30 
existing precedent. If there is more than one possible interpretation of this 
existing legal practice, the judge must then identify the interpretation of the 
law that best justifies the law as a whole in the light of principles of political 
                                                     
4 Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd & Others v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2008] 
NZSC 115, [2009] 2 NZLR 289. 
5 Ronald Dworkin “The Model of Rules” (1967) 35 The University of Chicago Law 
Review 14 at 41. 
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morality. This interpretation of the law will provide the right answer to the 
case.6  
Dworkin described legal principles as fundamentally different from legal 
rules. Legal rules, he said, are laid down in statue or by the common law 
and are therefore either valid or invalid, and either apply conclusively in a 5 
given case or do not. Principles, on the other hand, do not come from case 
law or statute, but develop over time because the legal profession and the 
public consider them to be appropriate.7 Principles do not necessitate a 
particular resolution to a case but point towards, or argue for, deciding a 
case in one way or another. Legal principles are general notions of justice 10 
and fairness that are broad and unspecific.8 For instance, one example of a 
principle that Dworkin gives is the maxim that “no man may profit from his 
own wrong.”9 When there is more than one principle underlying a particular 
statute or body of precedent then the judge is legally bound to weigh the 
conflicting principles against each other and assess which principle is 15 
stronger in order to come to the right answer to the case. Although judges 
may do this with reference to their subjective values, Dworkin maintained 
that, because judges are bound to apply any competing relevant principles, 
they do not have strong discretion in the way that he understood positivist 
theories of law to incorporate discretion.10  20 
Dworkin’s theory of law is largely based on a critique of the theory 
developed by leading positivist scholar, HLA Hart.
11
 Hart’s theory of law is 
based upon the existence of what he identified as the rule of recognition. 
The rule of recognition is the ultimate rule of the legal system because it 
provides the criteria for the validity of all of the other rules of the system. A 25 
law will be valid if it is passed in accordance with the rule of recognition.12 
                                                     
6 Ronald Dworkin Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1986) at 254-258. 
This book contains an expanded version of the theory first posited in “The Model of 
Rules”, above n 5. 
7 Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1978) at 
40. 
8 Dworkin “The Model of Rules”, above n 5, at 25-26. 
9 Dworkin “The Model of Rules”, above n 5, at 23-24 citing the case of Riggs v Palmer 22 
NE 188 (NY 1889). 
10 Dworkin “The Model of Rules”, above n 5, at 27- 34. By strong discretion Dworkin was 
referring to the idea that judges must look beyond the law and apply extra-legal standards 
to resolve a case. 
11 Dworkin’s critique of Hart changed substantially over time. In “The Model of Rules”, 
Dworkin argued that the main deficiency in Hart’s theory was that it could not account for 
the existence of legal principles. (At 22). In Law’s Empire, Dworkin argued that positivism 
cannot explain theoretical disagreement about the law; that is, when judges dispute what 
must take place in the legal system before a proposition of law is true. This is a result of a 
plain-fact approach to law. (At 4-6). For an in-depth discussion of Dworkin’s theory of law, 
see Scott J Shapiro “The ‘Hart-Dworkin’ Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed” (2007) 
University of Michigan Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 77. 
12 HLA Hart The Concept of Law (2nd ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) at 81-99. 
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Hart argued that the laws identified by the rule of recognition have open 
textures as a result of the open texture of language. Each law has a core and 
a penumbra. It is certain that the law will apply to fact scenarios within the 
core of the law because these scenarios will clearly fit the within the general 
language used in the relevant section of the statute. However, within the 5 
penumbra of the law it may be uncertain whether the law applies.
13
 In such 
cases, Hart argued that the law is fundamentally incomplete. When a judge 
decides such a case, the judge is not constrained by any legal rules; rather 
the judge is unregulated and must exercise discretion.
14
 Hart still maintained 
that in exercising discretion the judge must not act arbitrarily and must have 10 
general reasons to justify his decision. Where Hart’s theory differs from 
Dworkin’s is that it holds that although judges may appeal to principles to 
decide cases, they are not legally obliged to do so. Therefore when they do 
rely on principles, they are reaching beyond the law.
15
 Further, the use of 
principles in judicial reasoning is only a matter of social fact. This means 15 
that at any time judges are free to stop using principles to guide their 
decisions.
16
  
The final theory of law that is relevant to the application of principles in 
the process of judicial reasoning is critical legal studies. Critical legal 
studies developed as a prominent theory of law in the 1970s. Its origin is 20 
usually traced back to American legal realism.17 Like Hart’s theory of law, 
critical legal theories leave room for the presence of moral principles in law. 
However, like Hart they do not attach importance to moral principles in 
limiting discretion in judicial decision-making. This is because critical legal 
scholars see the law as indeterminate. Theories of radical indeterminacy 25 
argue that the law is indeterminate in nearly all cases because every area of 
law embodies conflicting principles and counter-principles that cannot be 
balanced or reconciled with one another.18 The result of these 
inconsistencies is that judges have the ability to decide all cases according 
to their own preferences. This argument differs from Hart’s theory, which 30 
holds that judges only have discretion in a limited number of cases at the 
margins or penumbra of a law.  The belief of critical legal scholars that the 
law is indeterminate is a part of the critical legal studies’ criticism of law as 
                                                     
13 HLA Hart The Concept of Law, above n 12, at 123. 
14 HLA Hart The Concept of Law, above n 12 at 252-255. 
15 HLA Hart The Concept of Law, above n 12, at 273-275.  
16 HLA Hart The Concept of Law, above n 12, at 250-260. 
17 See for example Gary Minda “Jurisprudence at Century’s End” (1993) 43 Journal of 
Legal Education 27 at 39-46; Duncan Kennedy and Karl Klare “Biography of Critical Legal 
Studies” (1984) 94 Yale Law Journal 461; Roberto Mangabeira Unger “The Critical Legal 
Studies Movement” (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 561. 
18 Ken Kress “Legal Indeterminacy” (1989) 77 CLR 283 at 288 and 302. 
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an institution that is geared to favour the wealthy elite. Critical legal 
scholars argue that judicial discretion creates the opportunity for judges to 
further perpetuate the imbalance of power created by the legal system in the 
hands of the elite by deciding cases in accordance with their own beliefs and 
values.  5 
Jack Balkin critiqued Dworkin’s theory of judicial interpretation through 
the lens of critical legal studies. He argued that even if a judge feels 
subjectively constrained to apply moral principles when deciding a case, in 
coming to a decision based on the principles that the judge considers best 
justify the law, the judge is simply writing his or her own ideological 10 
preferences into the law.19 Balkin argued that a judge is:20 
So thoroughly invested in her own world view that it always 
seems to her that the best moral/political theory that fits the 
largest number of cases is the theory that comports with her 
ideological convictions. 15 
This is made possible, Balkin argued, by the fact that tension between legal 
doctrines or principles can be found within every individual judgment or 
statute.21 A 2005 study of judicial voting data of the United States Courts of 
Appeal in the light of Dworkin’s theory of interpretation found that the 
presence of principles and an increasing amount of relevant precedent do not 20 
eliminate judicial discretion. In fact, the authors concluded that as the 
number of prior decisions in a given area of law increased, individual judges 
appeared to be more able to decide the case based on their ideological 
preferences.22 These findings support Balkin’s view of judicial discretion 
and the effect of precedent.  25 
The divergence in views between the three different jurisprudential 
theories means that, in order to assess which theory presents the best 
interpretation of judicial application of the avoidance provision, it is 
important not only to assess whether principles are used in judicial decision-
making but also, if principles are used, to look at the effect of the principles. 30 
Specifically, it is necessary to analyse whether the presence of principles can 
be seen as equating to an absence of judicial discretion, as Dworkin asserts, 
or rather to a way for the judge to come to a decision not by applying law 
but by applying his or her own value system. Additionally, because Hart 
argues that judges are not legally obliged to apply principles, it is also 35 
                                                     
19 JM Balkin “Taking Ideology Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the CLS Critique” (1987) 
55 UMKC Law Review 392 at 422. 
20 Balkin, above n 19, at 423. 
21 Balkin, above n 19, at 413. 
22 Stefanie A Lindquist and Frank B Cross “Empirically Testing Dworkin's Chain Novel 
Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent” (2005) 80 NYUL Rev 1156. 
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necessary to evaluate whether judges apply moral principles as a matter of 
law, or whether the application of principles is one available technique in 
judicial decision-making that a judge may, but is not required to, use.  
B The Application of Moral Principles to Tax Law: Evidence from Case 
Law 5 
To evaluate which theory of law presents the most accurate description of 
the process of judicial decision-making, it is of course necessary to start by 
looking at the judgments themselves. This section will therefore explore 
whether tax judgments in general make any explicit reference to moral 
principles.  10 
The answer suggested by a preliminary look at the case law is that judges 
do not apply moral principles.  The cases show that not only do judges say 
that they are not applying moral principles, they often emphasise that there 
is no place for moral judgments in tax law. For example, in Mangin v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue, the court said that “moral precepts are not 15 
appropriate to the application of revenue statutes.”23 Similarly, in Miller v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue the Privy Council cautioned against the 
use of the word impropriety in relation to tax avoidance arrangements. Their 
Lordships said that this suggested a moral judgment that they thought 
“inappropriate” and further that such a judgment had “been consistently 20 
repudiated in cases on tax avoidance schemes in England and New 
Zealand.”24 More recently, the Supreme Court in Ben Nevis reaffirmed this 
approach. The majority stated that when applying s BG 1 to a given scenario, 
courts should not be distracted by “intuitive subjective impressions of … 
morality.”25  25 
A similar approach to the irrelevance of morality can be seen in United 
States decisions. For example, Learned Hand J said in the case of 
Commissioner v Newman:26 
There is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s affairs as 
to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich 30 
or poor, and all do right; for nobody owes any public 
duty to pay more than the law demands. To demand more 
in the name or morals is mere cant. 
These cases are part of a long line of authority which says that tax 
avoidance is not immoral, because there is no moral obligation for people to 35 
                                                     
23 Mangin v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1971] NZLR 591 (PC) at 594. 
24 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] UKPC 17, [2001] 3 NZLR 316 at [9]. 
25 Ben Nevis, above n 4, at [102]. 
26 Commissioner v Newman 159 F 2d 848 (2nd Cir 1947) at 850-851. 
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arrange their affairs in a way that enables the tax department to take as 
much tax as possible.27 This approach to tax was discussed in detail by Zoe 
Prebble and John Prebble. They argue that this stems from several 
unsubstantiated assumptions. The first is the idea that there is a moral 
entitlement to pre-tax income. 28 The second assumption is that tax 5 
avoidance is not harmful.
29
 Thirdly, tax avoidance cannot be immoral 
because tax is not something that exists outside of law, so tax avoidance 
could only be immoral if it were also illegal.30 The final assumption is that 
the morality of an act can be determined independently of law.
31
 After 
discussing and rejecting these four assumptions the authors conclude that 10 
tax evasion is morally wrong by virtue of both its contents and of its legal 
status. Because of the fact that tax avoidance is almost factually 
indistinguishable from tax evasion, they argue that tax avoidance should 
similarly be seen as immoral.
32
 
There are several cases in which judges have adopted the view endorsed 15 
by Zoe Prebble and John Prebble that tax avoidance is immoral. For 
example, in both Latilla v Commissioner of Inland Revenue and Ensign 
Tankers Ltd v Stoakes the court was critical of the significant negative 
effects of tax avoidance on other taxpayers, suggesting that tax avoiders 
unfairly circumvent their duty to contribute to society. 33 However, the 20 
strong statements that morality is irrelevant in some of the most often-cited 
judgments on tax avoidance provide a strong indication to lower court 
judges that it is not appropriate for their decisions to be influenced by 
morality. Therefore, direct statements in case law indicate that moral 
principles do not play a part in judicial decision-making in tax avoidance 25 
cases. 
 
D The Application of Moral Principles to Tax Law: What Judges Say 
Extra Judicially 
Direct statements in the case law about the irrelevance of morality are an 30 
important starting point when assessing whether there is room for the 
application of moral principles in tax law. However, several legal theorists 
indicate that judicial pronouncements in cases should be treated with care. 
                                                     
27 See for example Lord Clyde’s famous dicta in Ayrshire Pullman Motor Servs and DM 
Ritchie v CIR [1929] 14 TC 754 (HL) at 763-764.  
28 Zoe Prebble and John Prebble “The Morality of Tax Avoidance” (2010) 43 Creighton L 
Rev 694 at 719-721. 
29 Zoe Prebble and John Prebble, above n 28, at 722-726. 
30 Zoe Prebble and John Prebble, above n 28, at 728. 
31 Zoe Prebble and John Prebble, above n 28, at 732-734. 
32 Zoe Prebble and John Prebble, above n 28, at 737. 
33 See Latilla v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1943] 1 All ER 265 (HL); Ensign 
Tankers Ltd v Stoakes [1992] 2 All ER 275 (HL), discussed below at [VII]. 
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These theorists are sceptical about the value of looking only at the judgment 
when trying to ascertain how a case has been decided. This is because a 
realist or pragmatic approach to judicial decision-making holds that a judge 
does not always explain the real reasons for his or her decision in the actual 
judgment.34 This is a result of the role that judges have in our society. A 5 
judge’s role is to be an unbiased interpreter of the law laid down by 
Parliament. Judges therefore risk losing their legitimacy if they are seen to 
decide cases with reference to non-legal factors such as their own 
preferences or ideologies.
35
 Therefore, even if a judge has reached a 
decision that was not dictated solely by law, or the judge’s decision has 10 
been influenced by his or her own feelings about the case, the judge will not 
admit this in the judgment itself. 
Like realist scholars, Dworkin did not treat what is written in a judgment 
as the whole story. According to his theory, the principles of political 
morality upon which judges rely are not necessarily explicitly referred to in 15 
judgments; rather they may simply be latent in the relevant area of law. It is 
the job of the scholar to look at the existing law and precedent to extract the 
principles implicit in judgments. This is in part because judicial application 
of moral principles may be either conscious or sub-conscious.36 
Finally, tax practitioners and academics commenting on tax avoidance 20 
decisions have often been critical about how judges have decided that there 
was tax avoidance in a particular case. For example, Eugene Trombitas 
argued that the question of whether there was tax avoidance would often 
turn on whether the court liked the transaction or not.37 
The above sceptical approaches suggest that it is not sufficient simply to 25 
take the statements from judges in their judgments that they have not 
applied moral principles at face value as the answer to the question of 
whether judges apply principles in tax cases. Therefore, this section of the 
essay will look at whether the extrajudicial writings of judges confirm or 
contradict the claims in judgments that judges do not apply moral principles 30 
in reaching their decisions. 
A survey of extrajudicial writing contradicts the claims in judgments that 
moral principles are irrelevant to judicial reasoning. Instead they provide 
preliminary support for the hypothesis that judges may apply principles 
                                                     
34 See James Allan “Statutory Interpretation and the Courts” (1999) 18 New Zealand 
University Law Review 439 at 439; Brien Leiter “Legal Realism” in Dennis M Patterson 
(ed) A Companion to Law and Legal Philosophy (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 1996) 
261at 269-270. 
35 Kress, above n 18, at 285; Michael Tushnet “Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique 
of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles” (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 781 at 781-782. 
36 Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously, above n 7, at 377-379. 
37 Trombitas, above n 2, at 597.  
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when reaching decisions. The first jurist whose writing supports this theory 
is Sir Ivor Richardson. Writing in 1967 about the interpretation of tax 
statutes, Sir Ivor said:38 
Judicial attitudes and their effect on the interpretation of 
revenue legislation hinge[d] on … the background and 5 
susceptibilities of the particular judge and the scope for 
divergent interpretations of the provisions in question.  
Although this statement alone seems to point towards unfettered judicial 
discretion, read in the context of two later articles, this statement can be seen 
as expressing the view that judges are influenced by underlying values when 10 
applying the law. Richardson's discussion in an essay in 1985 can be read as 
supporting the argument that judges are influenced by principles. There he 
said:39 
In a relatively small number of cases the legal answer is 
not automatic … In such cases what course is followed 15 
reflects a value judgment on the judge’s part. The judicial 
answer will depend upon the conscious or unconscious 
assessment of the underlying values involved. The judge 
is engaged in a balancing exercise. 
Similarly, in the specific context of the anti-avoidance rule Sir Ivor noted 20 
that uncertainty arose from differing judicial perspectives on morality. The 
interpretative approach taken, he concluded, inevitably depended on judicial 
attitudes and on the perspectives that judges had of community values.40 
Another example of judicial acknowledgement of principles is found in 
the work Sir Edmund Thomas, who was a member of the New Zealand 25 
Court of Appeal from 1995 to 2001. In his book about judicial process, 
Thomas said that legal principles were of central importance in judicial 
reasoning.41 In a similar article, Thomas considered the direction in Ben 
Nevis that judges should not be distracted by subjective impressions of the 
morality of an arrangement. In response to this direction he said that he was 30 
not suggesting that judges should incorporate subjective impressions of 
morality, rather that judges should indicate the value judgment on which 
their decision was based “in pursuit of the need for transparency in judicial 
                                                     
38 ILM Richardson “Attitudes to Income Tax Avoidance” (1967) 30 NZJPA 1 at 16. 
39 ILM Richardson “The Role of Judges as Policy Makers” (1985) 15 VUWLR 46 at 46. 
40 Ivor Richardson “Reducing Tax Avoidance by Changing Structures, Processes and 
Drafting” in Graeme Stuart Cooper (ed) Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (IBDF 
Publications and the Australian Tax Research Foundation, Amsterdam, 1997) 327 at 329-
330. 
41 EW Thomas The Judicial Process: Realism, Pragmatism, Practical Reasoning and 
Principles (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) at 118 - 226 and 339. 
  Harriet Bush 
  LAWS 516 
 
12 
 
adjudication.”
42
 Therefore, although Thomas did not think that judges should 
be influenced by vague moral impressions, he nevertheless considered that a 
value judgment, or invocation of a principle, was part of the decision-
making process.  
The extrajudicial work of two respected Australian judges is also 5 
enlightening. Justice Hill, of the Federal Court of Australia, expressed a 
similar attitude to judicial decision-making. He considered that the 
application of statutory interpretation to a particular statute and that statute’s 
application to a set of facts often left the judge “discretion to reach a 
conclusion which he or she perceive[d] to be just.”43 10 
Justice Kirby, of the Australian High Court, in reflecting upon the 
moment of decision in judicial decision making, concluded that:44 
Sometimes the decision may emerge, with pure logic, 
from the application of a clear and settled legal principle 
to simple and uncontested facts. But… often the 15 
applicable principle is not clear. The Act of Parliament is 
unclear. The facts are disputed and uncertain. Choices 
must be made.  
What is immediately apparent from these examples is that although these 
judges accept that there is room in decision-making for them to apply 20 
underlying community values or principles, none of the judges view the 
existence of principles as eliminating judicial discretion in the way that 
Dworkin describes. That is, although Dworkin sees the presence of 
principles as creating a binding obligation on judges to come to a decision 
based on moral principles of justice and fairness, and believes that the 25 
assessment of principles will lead the judge to the right answer to the case, 
judges view the application of principles and community values as a 
complex task often involving a careful balancing exercise and considered 
use of their discretion. 
In Dworkin’s view, a theory of law such as Hart’s that does not 30 
incorporate principles as part of the law allows judges to decide cases not 
according to any particular standards but by reaching beyond the law and 
deciding cases in any way they want. If judges are bound to apply principles, 
however, Dworkin argued that this would eliminate discretion in this 
                                                     
42 EW Thomas “The Evolution from Form to Substance in Tax Law: the Demise of the 
Dysfunctional ‘Metwand’” (2011) 19 Waikato L Rev 17 at 23.  
43 DG Hill “How is Tax Law to be Understood by Courts?” (2001) The Tax Specialist 226 
at 233. 
44 Hon Justice Michael Kirby “Judging: Reflecting on the Moment of Decision” (paper 
presented at the 5th National Conference on Reasoning and Decision-Making, Wagga 
Wagga, 4 December 1998). 
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stronger sense. However, Dworkin does admit that even when principles are 
included, there remains an element of discretion, because when a judge 
decides between competing principles the judge must exercise judgment.45 
Dworkin’s approach to discretion has been criticised as “based on a 
peculiarly narrow notion of what it means to have discretion to make a 5 
choice”
46
and inconsistent with our ordinary understanding or judicial 
responsibility for opinion.47 
These articles demonstrate a more pragmatic approach to the effect of 
principles on judicial decision-making than Dworkin’s theory does. The 
judges indicate that ultimately the question of which principle to apply will 10 
come down to a value judgment on that judge’s part and further, that it is this 
room to choose between competing principles or values that is the type of 
discretion that is important. The articles also seem to endorse Hart’s 
approach to decision-making, that not every case will leave room for the 
application of principles. Rather, principles might be appealed to when there 15 
is a gap between the law as written in the statute and the answer to how the 
law should apply in the case, or, as Sir Ivor Richardson said, when the 
answer is not automatic. Finally, these statements show that while the judges 
accept an element of discretion, the principles or values they apply in hard 
cases will be informed by community values rather than their subjective 20 
feelings.  
Because of the scepticism shown by legal theorists towards the accuracy 
of pronouncements in case law, this paper adopts the comments of judges 
concerning judicial reasoning in extrajudicial writings as the framework for 
analysing the application of s BG 1. Extrajudicial writings support Hart’s 25 
proposition that it is only in some cases that judges have the ability to decide 
according to principle. Therefore, this paper also adopts the view that it is 
only in some cases that there is room for judges to use principles. This 
means that it is necessary to assess in which avoidance cases judges will 
have the ability to apply principles and why this is so. In other words, before 30 
cases are analysed for the presence of principles, it must be established when 
and why applying s BG 1 will amount to a hard case where a judge may rely 
upon principles. 
                                                     
45 Dworkin Law’s Empire, above n 6, at 260-267. 
46 Kent Greenwalt “Discretion and Judicial Decision: the Elusive Quest for the Fetters that 
Bind Judges” (1975) 75 Columbia Law Review 359 at 361. 
47 Greenwalt above n 46, at 361. 
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III The General Anti-Avoidance Rule Landscape 
In order to evaluate which avoidance decisions will allow judges to apply 
principles, the features of tax avoidance and the scope of s BG 1 must first be 
laid out. Tax avoidance may be described as “contriving transactions … so 
as to reduce the tax that would otherwise be payable according to be the 5 
policy of the taxing provision in question.”48 It results in narrowing the tax 
base and undermining the efficiency, equity and integrity of the tax system.49 
Although New Zealand has had a GAAR that applies to income tax since 
1891,50 the first reported case applying the section was not until 1938.51 The 
avoidance provision is contained in s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 2007. This 10 
section states that a tax avoidance arrangement is void as against the 
Commissioner for Income Tax purposes.  Tax avoidance arrangement is 
defined as:
52
 
 an arrangement, whether entered into by the person 
affected by the arrangement or by another person, that 15 
directly or indirectly-  
(a) has tax avoidance as its purpose or effect; or   
(b) has tax avoidance as 1 of its purposes or effects, 
whether or not any other purpose or effect is referable to 
ordinary business or family dealings, if the tax avoidance 20 
purpose or effect is not merely incidental. 
 
Tax avoidance includes:53  
(a) directly or indirectly altering the incidence of any 
income tax:   25 
(b) directly or indirectly relieving a person from liability 
to pay income tax or from a potential or prospective 
liability to future income tax:   
(c) directly or indirectly avoiding, postponing, or reducing 
any liability to income tax or any potential or prospective 30 
liability to future income tax. 
 
When an arrangement is declared void as a tax avoidance arrangement, the 
Commissioner has the power to adjust the taxpayer’s taxable income in a 
                                                     
48 Rebecca Prebble and John Prebble “Does the Use of General Anti-Avoidance Rules to 
Combat Tax Avoidance Breach Principles of the Rule of Law? A Comparative Study” 
(2010) 55 Saint Louis University Law Journal 21 at 22. 
49 Eberson, above n 84, at 267. 
50 Land and Income Tax Assessment Act 1891. 
51 Timaru Herald Co Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes [1938] NZLR 978 (CA).  
52 Income Tax Act 2007, s YA 1.  
53 Income Tax Act 2007, s YA 1. 
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way that the Commissioner thinks is appropriate in order to counteract the 
tax avoidance advantage gained.54   
A The Nature of Section BG 1 
Several articles concerning the GAAR suggest that the GAAR may be different 
from other laws because it allows judges to decide whether the GAAR applies 5 
according to underlying principles in every case. They argue that this is 
because the GAAR does not contain a core where it is certain that it applies to 
fact scenarios, but rather may be only penumbra.
55
 For example, Michael 
Littlewood argued that:56 
Most legal concepts have a more or less solid core and are 10 
disputed only at the margins… But the idea of tax 
avoidance has no core… for there is no such thing as a 
non-contestable case of tax avoidance.  
However, it is questionable whether this approach is correct. 
One explanation for the uncertainty that is involved in the application of 15 
this section is the approach that was traditionally taken to its interpretation 
by the courts. The courts have long accepted that a literal interpretation of 
the section would result in it catching transactions at which it was obviously 
not aimed.
57
 This is because, if its meaning is ascertained solely from the 
words of the avoidance provision, it would extend to any transaction that 20 
alters the incidence of tax payable. As Woodhouse J said, “nearly all 
disposition of property or income must carry with them some consequential 
effect upon income tax liabilities.”58 These problems resulted in courts 
trying to provide ways of restricting the section so that it had a desirable, 
reasonable and predictable ambit by placing judicial glosses on the words of 25 
the statute to limit its scope.59 
In Ben Nevis the court rejected judicial attempts to place glosses on the 
section, saying that these had too often been seized upon as the equivalent to 
statutory language. Ascertaining whether an arrangement amounted to tax 
avoidance, the court said, had to be grounded in the statutory language of 30 
the avoidance provision and any provision that the taxpayers were seeking 
                                                     
54 Income Tax Act 2007, s GA 1. 
55 Rebecca Prebble and John Prebble, above n 48, at 29. 
56 Michael Littlewood “Tax Avoidance, the Rule of Law and the New Zealand Supreme 
Court” [2011] NZ L Rev 35 at 37. 
57 See for example Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Gerard [1974] 2 NZLR 279 (CA) at 
280.  
58 Elmiger v CIR [1966] NZLR 638 (CA) at 688. 
59 GT Pagone “Aspects of Tax Avoidance: Trans-Tasman Observations” (paper presented 
to the International Fiscal Association Conference, Wellington, March 2011) at 14. 
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to rely on to gain a tax advantage.
60
 The majority of the court therefore laid 
down what has become known as the parliamentary contemplation test to 
determine whether an arrangement amounts to tax avoidance. This test will 
be discussed in greater detail in the following section. The test is based on a 
purposive interpretation of the avoidance provision and the provision relied 5 
on by the taxpayer. Now that the court refuses to use judicial glosses to limit 
the scope of the section, the rejection of a strict interpretation of the section 
alone cannot be seen as creating uncertainty in the application of the GAAR, 
or leading to a law containing only penumbra. Accepting the argument that 
the lack of a literal approach to the avoidance section in itself results in a 10 
law containing only penumbra would be endorsing the view rejected earlier 
that purposive interpretation inevitably leads to less certainty than literal 
interpretation. Furthermore, the Supreme Court itself rejected the view that 
all tax avoidance decisions would come within the penumbra or margin of 
the law. The court said that:61 15 
As in many areas of the law, there are bound to be 
difficult cases at the margins. But in most cases we 
consider it will be possible, without undue difficulty, to 
decide on which side of the line a particular arrangement 
falls. 20 
There are two further reasons why the GAAR appears to have a larger 
penumbra than most laws. The first is the reason behind the GAAR itself. 
GAARs are enacted to cover tax avoidance arrangements which the 
legislature has not considered.62 For example, GAARs will apply to prevent 
the use of a provision to gain a tax advantage in a manner that the legislature 25 
could not have foreseen. The presence of a GAAR in legislation is recognition 
that it is not possible for the legislature to predict all of the different 
structures that may be used to avoid tax.63 The second reason that the GAAR 
seems to contain a larger penumbra than most laws is a result of the nature 
of tax planning and tax avoidance. In other areas of the law, people tend to 30 
“stick to the well-trodden path”.
64
 In tax avoidance cases, however, 
taxpayers invent new schemes and deliberately place themselves close to the 
boundary of the law to test how much they can get away with.65 This results 
                                                     
60 Ben Nevis, above n 4, at [103]. 
61 Ben Nevis, above n 4, at [112]. 
62 Rebecca Prebble and John Prebble, above n 48, at 29. 
63 Rebecca Prebble and John Prebble, above n 48, at 30. 
64 Eberson, above n 84, at 269. 
65 Eberson, above n 84, at 269. See also John Braithwaite “Rules and Principles: A Theory 
of Legal Certainty” (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 47 at 54.  
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in more of the cases that come before the courts being within the penumbra 
of the law.  
If it is accepted that the GAAR is not only penumbra, it is necessary to 
establish in which circumstances a case concerning tax avoidance will 
amount to a hard case.  In order to come to a conclusion on this point, the 5 
parliamentary contemplation test laid out in Ben Nevis must be examined in 
greater detail.  
B The Parliamentary Contemplation Test 
The approach outlined by the majority of the Supreme Court in Ben Nevis 
ascertained the meaning of s BG 1 by looking at the relationship between the 10 
avoidance provision and other sections of the Act that give some sort of tax 
advantage. The court said that if a taxpayer has used a section in a way that 
falls within the ordinary meaning of that section and gained a tax advantage, 
this will be a permissible tax advantage.66 However, where a taxpayer has 
used a specific provision in a way which falls outside of the intended scope 15 
of the provision in the overall scheme of the Act and gained a tax advantage, 
then this use will amount to an impermissible tax advantage and the 
arrangement will be void under s BG 1.67  As the court said:68 
If, when viewed in that light, it is apparent that the 
taxpayer has used the specific provision, and thereby 20 
altered the incidence of income tax, in a way which 
cannot have been within the contemplation and purpose of 
Parliament when it enacted the provision, the arrangement 
will be a tax avoidance arrangement. 
The court then set out a number of factors that were important to look at 25 
when considering a tax avoidance arrangement. These were the manner in 
which the arrangement was carried out, the role of all relevant parties and 
their relationship with the taxpayer, the economic and commercial effect of 
the transactions, the duration of the transaction and its financial 
consequences for the taxpayer. A classic indication of a use of a provision 30 
that is outside of Parliament’s contemplation, the court said, was where the 
transaction was structured so that the taxpayer gained the benefit of the 
specific provision in an artificial or contrived way.69 More recently, the 
parliamentary contemplation test was followed by the Court of Appeal in its 
decision in Alesco New Zealand Limited v Commissioner of Inland 35 
                                                     
66 Ben Nevis, above n 4, at [106]. 
67 At [106]. 
68 At [107]. 
69 At [108]. 
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Revenue.
70
 After laying out the test and the above factors, the court noted 
that artifice and contrivance could be hallmarks of tax avoidance.71 
At first glance, the court’s approach in Ben Nevis seems to be rather like 
the court laying down its own test for tax avoidance, and setting out a 
number of factors that will point to an avoidance arrangement. However, the 5 
majority emphasised that it was not setting out its own rule or providing a 
judicial gloss on the operation of the section. As already stated, the majority 
emphasised that where the line should be drawn between tax avoidance and 
tax mitigation should be firmly grounded in the statutory language of the 
provisions themselves.72 The definition of avoidance is an arrangement that 10 
directly or indirectly alters the incidence of income tax. However, many of 
the sections of the Act encourage a taxpayer to undertake courses of action 
which alter tax. Therefore, it is only when tax has been altered by using a 
section in a way not contemplated by Parliament that there has been tax 
avoidance.  15 
C The Effect of the Parliamentary Contemplation Test upon when s BG 1 
Will Be a Hard Case 
The previous section of this paper left open the question of when a given 
case will be a hard case within the penumbra of the GAAR. According to 
Eugene Trombitas, hard cases will arise when the intention of Parliament is 20 
inadequately or imperfectly expressed.
73
 This paper accepts that the 
parliamentary contemplation test is, as the majority said, the result of an 
exercise in statutory interpretation based on reconciling the GAAR and the 
specific statutory provision of the Income Tax Act. This acceptance means 
that Trombitas’ theory must be correct. Hard cases will arise when it is not 25 
clear whether the arrangement in question is, or would have been, within 
Parliament’s contemplation when it enacted a specific provision. This will 
occur when it is hard to ascertain what Parliament’s intention was when it 
enacted a certain provision. Therefore, the question is whether in these cases, 
where the judge is unable to ascertain whether the specific section would 30 
have been meant to apply to a particular arrangement, judges appear to look 
to principles to see whether they should apply the GAAR or not. 
The parliamentary contemplation test limits uncertainty in the GAAR's 
application to the extent that the Supreme Court has resolved the test that the 
                                                     
70 Alesco New Zealand Limited v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2013] NZCA 40, 
[2013] 2 NZLR 175.  
71 At [25].  
72 Ben Nevis, above n 4, at [104]. 
73 Eugene Trombitas “Comment: Trinity Exposed: Does the Emperor Really Have No 
Clothes or is He Wearing an Unusual Silver Rugby Jersey? The Latest News from the 
GAAR Front” (2007) 13 NZJTLP 583 at 593. 
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courts will apply to determine whether there has been tax avoidance. 
However, because pre-Ben Nevis approaches to the GAAR were not directly 
based on statutory interpretation but allowed for judicial glosses and judge-
made rules,74 the application of the GAAR was a hard case in all 
circumstances. This is because it was never clear where, or based upon what, 5 
judges would choose to draw the line between tax avoidance and tax 
mitigation. The GAAR’s application was not governed by the words of the 
provision, but by varying judicial glosses placed on the section. Ben Nevis 
itself was arguably a hard case, not because of the facts of the case, but 
because of these same reasons; the court was faced with differing 10 
interpretations and conflicting precedent on the GAAR.  
The result of the foregoing discussion is the conclusion that, due to 
judicial approach to the section prior to Ben Nevis and the nature of tax 
planning, the application of the GAAR did and still does often leave room for 
judges to apply principles in reaching their decisions. The next section will 15 
therefore explore what the principles that judges may rely on in hard cases 
are. 
IV What Are the Possible Principles in Tax Law? 
This section of the paper draws on secondary literature to discover principles 
that tax scholars have identified as underlying tax law.  Tax avoidance 20 
judgments will then be analysed to establish whether the influence of the two 
principles identified in the secondary literature can be felt in judgements. 
First, it is notable that tax law is often described as an area of law which 
is full of contradictions and competing interests and policies. This is 
important to remember when searching for principles because it suggests 25 
that this area of law is more likely to have conflicting underlying principles. 
For example, in the Court of Appeal decision in the case of Challenge 
Corporation v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Richardson J noted in his 
judgment that it was “obviously fallacious to assume that revenue legislation 
has a totally coherent scheme or that it follows a completely consistent 30 
pattern.”75 One reason may be the need to make tax law workable, and so 
rather than the overarching consideration being to create law based on 
interrelated, logical principle, the driving factor is practicality.76 Similarly, 
                                                     
74See for example the criticism of the judicial application of the GAAR in Thomas J’s 
dissenting judgment in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v BNZ Investments Ltd [2002] 1 
NZLR 450 at [63].  
75 Challenge Corporation v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1986] 2 NZLR 513 (PC) at 
549. 
76 John Prebble “Why is Tax Law Incomprehensible?” [1994] British Tax Review 380 at 
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Mark Burton argued that when tax legislation is brought to the court it 
almost invariably embodies a compromise. He said that this compromise 
leaves the way open for alternative interpretations of that compromise.77 The 
competing values embodied in tax statues are often identified as the values 
of individualism and communalism.78 These competing values have been 5 
articulated in two distinct principles that emerge in secondary literature 
about tax law. The first is the principle that tax should apply uniformly to all 
cases that are economically similar.79 The second principle is that the 
taxpayer is entitled to structure his affairs to pay no more tax than the law 
requires.80  10 
A Tax Should Apply Uniformly to All Cases That are Economically Similar 
The first principle identified in legal commentary on tax law reflects a 
communal view of the taxation system. It is expressed by John Miller as the 
principle that tax should apply uniformly to all cases that are economically 
similar.81 This principle is also often expressed as the ability-to-pay 15 
principle, and it is this principle that provides a justification for a system of 
progressive taxation based on income rather than any other criteria.82 
Miller’s articulation of the principles is adopted in this paper because his 
articulation emphasises the comparative nature of the principle. The 
principle embodies the belief that the tax system should strive for horizontal 20 
and vertical equity; that is, that taxpayers who are similarly situated should 
be treated in the same manner, and that there should be fairness in the 
taxation of different income classes.83 According to this principle, a fair 
share of tax is the amount of tax that is equal to the amount that a similarly 
placed taxpayer is paying, regardless of whether this amount could be 25 
lowered through tax planning or schemes. Inherent in the principle is the 
acceptance that it is important that people believe that the tax system treats 
them fairly. Because the tax system rests on voluntary compliance, it is 
important that taxpayers perceive that they are being treated equally with 
                                                     
77 Mark Burton “The Rhetoric of Tax Interpretation- Where Talking the Talk is Not 
Walking the Walk” (2005) 1(3) Journal of the Australasian Tax Teachers Association 1 at 
19. 
78Balkin, above n 19, at 413. 
79 John A Miller “Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification 
in the Law of Taxation” (1993) 68 Washington Law Review 1 at 13-14; Joseph M Dodge 
“Theories of Tax Justice: Rumination on the Benefit, Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay 
Principles” (2005) 58 New York University Tax Law Review 399. 
80 Miller, above n 79, at 14. 
81 Miller, above n 79, at 13-14. Miller uses the word “case” in a wider economic rather than 
as referring to a legal case. 
82 See for example Dodge, above n 79, at 449; Anthony C Infanti “Tax Equity” (2008) 55 
Buffalo Law Review 1191 at 1226 
83 Michael A Livingston “Radical Scholars, Conservative Field: Putting Critical Tax 
Studies into Perspective” (1998) 76 North Carolina Law Review 1791 at 1793-1796. 
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other taxpayers, otherwise it is less likely that they will comply with their 
obligations.84 Sir Ivor Richardson also noted that this principle of tax views 
tax avoidance arrangements as sterile and unproductive and having social 
consequences that are contrary to the general public interest.85  
Tony Honoré argued that in complex modern societies, law is necessary 5 
to give effect to vague moral norms.
86
 Taxation gives shape to the abstract 
moral duty to contribute to one’s society.87 According to this first principle, 
therefore, this duty is defined by Parliament in the amount of taxes that 
should be paid, and this is an amount which is consistent with the amount 
paid by others in similar circumstances. 10 
The inevitable result of this principle is the application of a substance 
over form approach to tax avoidance.88 This is because the only way that tax 
can apply equally to all cases that are economically similar is if judges look 
past the legal form of transactions to their economic substance. The doctrine 
of substance over form requires the court to look at whether the economic 15 
reality of a transaction matches the legal form that it is expressed in, so that 
the transaction can be taxed according to the economic reality. This 
approach to taxation was also endorsed by Sir Edmund Thomas. He said that 
because income is derived from the substance of a transaction and not its 
form, in order to collect tax on net income,89 the courts needed to look at the 20 
substance of the transaction.90 Thomas described this as the basic principle 
which had influenced his approach to all taxation cases.
91
 
B Taxpayers Are Entitled to Structure Their Affairs So As to Pay No More 
Tax Than the Law Requires 
The second principle identified in the secondary literature is that taxpayers 25 
may structure their affairs so as to pay no more tax than the law requires. As 
Sir Ivor Richardson put it, according to this view of taxation, taxes are 
enforced extractions and everyone is entitled to arrange their affairs to make 
the tax that is payable as low as possible.92 This principle is to some extent 
contradictory with the first principle because, rather than emphasising 30 
                                                     
84 Harry Ebersohn “Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law” [2012] NZ L Rev 243 at 250. 
85 Richardson “Reducing Tax Avoidance by Changing Structures”, above n 40, at 270-271. 
86 Tony Honoré “The Dependence of Morality on Law (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 1 at 49. 
87 Zoe Prebble and John Prebble, above n 30, at 763. 
88 Miller, above 79, at 14. 
89 This is one of the purposes of the Act: Income Tax Act 2007, s AA 1(a). 
90 See Thomas’ dissenting judgment in Peter v Davison [1999] 2 NZLR 164 (CA) at 201 as 
discussed in EW Thomas “The Evolution from Form to Substance in Tax Law”, above n 
42, at 18-19.  
91 Thomas “The Evolution from Form to Substance in Tax Law”, above n 42, at 19. 
92 Richardson “Reducing Tax Avoidance by Changing Structures”, above n 40, at 269. 
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communal obligations to contribute to society, it emphasises individualist 
notions such as the right to property, the right to be free from overreaching 
government and freedom of contract.93 Nevertheless the two principles will 
not always conflict. Taken together, the principles hold that every taxpayer 
should be taxed in the same way as other taxpayers who are similarly 5 
situated, and that they may all use the available opportunities to minimise 
the amount of tax that they must pay. The principles will conflict when the 
second principle is taken to the extreme and tax is minimised in such a way 
that the transaction results in significantly lower tax liability than similar 
transactions.   10 
The second principle proceeds from a belief that although the government 
has the power to collect tax, it has no intrinsic right to a set amount of 
property.94 Rather, if the government wishes to collect tax, it must impose 
tax in clear and unambiguous terms.
95
 If it does not do so, the taxpayer is 
entitled to use any ambiguity in the legislation to lower the amount of tax 15 
that he or she must pay. Miller argues that this principle is often the principle 
that is appealed to by tax planners. Because tax planners wish to minimise 
their tax obligations, and cannot do so unless they know where the lower 
limit of what they must legally pay is, this principle is often embodied in 
calls for certainty in tax law and the application of tax statutes.96 Taxation is 20 
fair, according to this principle, when the application of the law is 
predictable and certain.
97
  
Appeals for certainty in the law are often used to justify a black letter or 
literal interpretation of the law. However, a literal interpretation of a statute 
does not inevitably lead to greater certainty than purposive interpretation.
98
 25 
For example, a literal interpretation may lead to less certainty when it results 
in absurdity.99 The underlying principle, which is that taxpayers are entitled 
to structure their affairs so as to pay only the amount of tax which the law 
requires, can still be determined through purposive interpretation. In other 
words, the amount of taxation that the law requires may be the amount that 30 
the statute, when interpreted purposively, imposes. 
It is important to separate the underlying principle from the use of black 
letter interpretation of tax statutes so that criticism of the use of this 
                                                     
93 Jinyan Li “Comparative Tax Law and Culture: Tax Transplants and Local Culture: A 
Comparative Study of the Chines and Canadian Gaar” (2010) 11 Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law 655 at 679. 
94 Miller, above n 79, at 14.  
95 Ebersohn, above n 84, at 249. 
96 Miller, above n 79, at 15. 
97 Miller, above n 79, at 15. 
98 Miller, above n 79, at 45-46. 
99See Ofer Raban “The Fallacy of Legal Certainty” (2010) 19/175 Boston University Public 
Interest Law Journal 1 at 5.  
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interpretation is not confused with criticism of the principle itself. However, 
the underlying principle has also been subject to criticism. For example, Zoe 
Prebble and John Prebble explain the critique of the principle that is based 
on John Locke’s theory of property. According to this line of argument, the 
principle rests upon the false, or at least unsubstantiated, assumption, noted 5 
above, that a taxpayer has a moral entitlement to his or her pre-tax 
income.100 This assumption is based upon the belief in a moral right to one’s 
property, which is seen as encompassing pre-tax income. However, this 
belief is arguably incorrect if property rights are seen as a creation of a legal 
system, because of the link between property rights, government and 10 
taxation. A legal system cannot exist without government, and government 
depends upon taxation, therefore, property rights depend on taxation.101 
This essay will return to the appropriateness of applying this principle in 
the context of the anti-avoidance rule. Before rejecting this principle 
outright, however, this essay will assess whether it is possible to discern the 15 
influence of this principle, or of the previous principle, in any of the courts’ 
decisions concerning tax avoidance.  
C Are the Antecedent Principles Dworkinian Principles? 
In order for any presence of the two identified principles to support 
Dworkin's interpretation of judicial reasoning, it must first be shown that the 20 
identified principles could be considered principles according to Dworkin's 
theory. The two principles represent different ideas of the circumstances 
which make the tax system fair and just. According to the first principle, the 
fundamental basis on which the fairness of the taxation system is judged is 
whether there is equality between similarly placed taxpayers. According to 25 
the second principle, it is fair that people are able to take advantage of any 
incentives that the tax system offers, even if this would lead to them being 
treated more favourably than others in similar circumstances. The focus of 
the principles on what is fair provides preliminary support for the hypothesis 
that they could be Dworkinian principles. Further support can be gleaned by 30 
comparing them to an example of principles given by Dworkin. In Law’s 
Empire, Dworkin discusses the possible principles underlying the awarding 
of damages in negligence. He uses the search for underlying principles as an 
example of how a judge could be guided when assessing whether to award 
damages in a case of emotional injury as opposed to physical injury. 35 
Traditionally, damages in negligence were only available in cases of 
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physical injury. Dworkin lays out six possible principles and then discusses 
which of these would be the best interpretation of the principle underlying 
negligence law.102 He concludes that the most appropriate articulation of the 
principle underlying negligence law is either that (1) people have a moral 
right to compensation for emotional or physical injury that is the 5 
consequence of careless conduct, but only if that injury was reasonably 
foreseeable or (2) that people have a moral right to compensation for 
reasonably foreseeable injury but not in circumstances when recognising 
such a right would impose a disproportionate burden on the person who 
caused it.103 Either of these principles could provide the underlying basis 10 
upon which any award of damages should be made. This shows that 
Dworkin conceives of principles as being of a breadth capable of guiding the 
interpretation and application of an entire area of the law. The principles 
described above are notions of justice and fairness of a similar breadth to 
Dworkin's examples of principles. Which of these principles is favoured by 15 
the judge will guide the judge’s interpretative approach to every application 
of tax legislation and justify the decision reached. It is therefore appropriate 
to use these principles when searching for the influence of principles in the 
judicial application of the avoidance provision. 
V A Search for the Presence of Principles in Tax Avoidance 20 
Decisions 
There are a number of arguments that repeatedly surface in tax avoidance 
cases. These arguments are used to advocate a particular approach to the 
GAAR. This section will consider the extent to which any of these arguments 
are influenced by, or can be seen to embody, either of the previously 25 
identified principles. If the arguments did embody the principles, this would 
provide support for the proposition that the principles are used to ascertain 
the correct scope of the GAAR. The relevant arguments are: the Duke of 
Westminster principle, the GAAR should not deprive the taxpayer of the 
opportunity to choose tax beneficial options, the courts should respect 30 
commercial certainty and the scope of the GAAR must be ascertained by 
looking at the relationship between it and the other sections of the Act. This 
section will conclude that although the first three arguments initially seem to 
support the second principle, the Supreme Court’s approach in Ben Nevis to 
each of these arguments means that they no longer provide any real support 35 
for the principle that taxpayers are entitled to structure their affairs to keep 
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their taxes as low as possible. The final argument amounts to no more than 
an argument of statutory interpretation. This again leaves the parliamentary 
contemplation test. The next section of the essay will discuss the 
parliamentary contemplation test, and evaluate whether this test 
demonstrates the presence of principles in tax avoidance decisions.  5 
A The Duke of Westminster Principle 
In the famous case of Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of 
Westminster, Lord Tomlin provided explicit judicial recognition of the 
second identified principle. His Lordship said that “every man is entitled, if 
he can, to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate Act 10 
is less than it otherwise would be.”104 The Duke of Westminster principle has 
been extremely influential in United Kingdom tax avoidance jurisprudence; 
however, its practical effect has arguably been reduced by the doctrine of 
fiscal nullity.105 This doctrine, laid down in the case of WT Ramsay v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners, allows a purposive approach to be taken to the 15 
interpretation of tax statues rather than the strict interpretation in the Duke of 
Westminster.
106 The impact of the Duke of Westminster principle can be seen 
in New Zealand case law in the second prominent argument raised in tax 
avoidance cases. Therefore, this essay will discuss that argument in more 
detail. 20 
B The GAAR Should Not Deprive Taxpayers of Tax Beneficial Choices 
The claim that taxpayers should have the ability to choose tax beneficial 
options is one of the most persistent arguments in tax avoidance 
jurisprudence. It has now become known as the choice principle. The 
argument was originally accepted by the Australian High Court in the case 25 
of WP Keighery v Federal Commissioner of Taxation. In this case the court 
said that the Australian GAAR was intended:107 
only to protect the general provisions of the Act from 
frustration, and not to deny to taxpayers any right of 
                                                     
104 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminster [1936] AC 1 (HL). The influence 
of this principle has been felt across the Commonwealth. For example, in Canada, the 
Declaration of Taxpayers’ Rights issued by the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency says 
that taxpayers are entitled to arrange their affairs to pay the least amount of tax the law 
allows. Discussing this case in “Reflections on the Relationship between Statutory 
Interpretation and Tax Avoidance” (2001) 49 Canadian Tax Journal 1 Brian Arnold noted 
that the case represented the fundamental principle on which Canadian tax-avoidance law 
was based. 
105 Sheila E Foster “Westminster Consigned to the Furnace”(1984) 8 Trent Law Journal 65 
at 68-69. 
106 WT Ramsay Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1982] STC 174. 
107 WP Keighery Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1957) 100 CLR 66 (HCA) at 
92. 
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choice between alternatives which the Act itself lays open 
to them.  
The court said that it was therefore important:108 
to consider whether the result of treating the section as 
applying in a case such as the present would be to render 5 
ineffectual an attempt to defeat etc a liability imposed by 
the Act or to render ineffectual an attempt to give a 
company an advantage which the Act intended that it 
might be given.  
This reasoning was later adopted by Richardson J in Challenge. He 10 
considered that the case provided powerful support for the proposition that 
adopting a course of action that the Income Tax Act specifically 
contemplated as effecting a tax change does not amount to tax avoidance.109 
The decision of the Privy Council in Miller v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue also reflected this idea. If the legislation, upon its true construction 15 
was intended to give the taxpayer the choice of avoiding tax in this way, 
their Lordships said that such action would not engage the GAAR.110 
The idea that taxpayers may choose a more tax beneficial option very 
closely resembles the principle that taxpayers are entitled to structure their 
affairs so as to pay no more tax than the law requires. However, the principle 20 
should not be seen as giving taxpayers free rein to engage in aggressive tax 
planning or tax avoidance. This is perhaps most clearly seen in the way that 
the New Zealand Supreme Court addressed this argument:
111
 
Taxpayers have the freedom to structure transactions to 
their best tax advantage. They may utilise available tax 25 
incentives in whatever way the applicable legislative text, 
read in the light of its context and purpose, permits. They 
cannot, however, do so in a way that is proscribed by the 
general anti-avoidance provision. 
As noted, the principle that taxpayers are entitled to structure their affairs 30 
so as to pay no more tax than the law requires has often been used to justify 
a black letter approach to revenue legislation that sees the GAAR as 
inconsistent with the idea of imposing tax in a principled and certain matter. 
However, this principle itself is not necessarily inconsistent with the GAAR if 
it is accepted that the GAAR is a part of determining the amount of taxation 35 
                                                     
108 Keighery, above n 107, at 92-93. 
109 Challenge (CA), above n 75, at 552.  
110 Miller, above n 24, at [9]. 
111 Ben Nevis, above n 4, at [111]. 
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that the law requires. In other words, the freedom to structure affairs only 
extends to paying as little tax as is consistent with the operation of the GAAR.  
While this means that this principle is still consistent with judicial 
interpretation of the GAAR, in reality the interpretation of the choice 
principle by the majority of the court in Ben Nevis leaves the underlying 5 
principle with very little guiding force. The purpose of Dworkin’s principles 
is to point judges to the interpretation of the law that is the best in terms of 
justice and fairness. However, applying the principle that you are entitled to 
pay as little tax as the law requires, only in so far as this is consistent with 
how much the GAAR says that you must pay, does not provide any tool for 10 
pointing to whether the GAAR should apply in a given situation or not. As 
interpreted in Ben Nevis, this principle is of no use in determining the 
appropriate scope of the GAAR.  
C The Need for Commercial Certainty 
The argument that the GAAR must be interpreted in a way that gives a 15 
reasonable amount of certainty to taxpayers is another argument that has 
been used to support a narrower interpretation of the GAAR. As explained 
above, the plea for certainty can be seen as an adoption of the principle that 
taxpayers are entitled to structure their affairs to pay no more tax than the 
law requires. This is because, it is argued, the only way that taxpayers can 20 
make their obligations as low as possible is if it is clear what the lowest 
amount of tax they can legally pay is. Judicial acceptance of the plea for 
commercial certainty could therefore be seen as an embodiment of the 
second principle and an indication that judges have been influenced by the 
principle. However, courts have often been careful in accepting arguments 25 
based on the importance of certainty. For example, in BNZ Investments the 
majority said that certainty and predictability were important but not 
absolute values.112 In his dissenting judgment in that case Thomas J noted 
that there was an unrealistic expectation of the certainty that it is possible to 
obtain with a GAAR. While it is desirable to achieve as much certainty as 30 
possible, general anti-avoidance provisions must necessarily be uncertain if 
they are to cover the multiplicity of schemes intended to avoid tax.
113
 
Further, the courts have considered that the claim that uncertainty is created 
for the general taxpayer by the operation of the GAAR requires serious but 
sceptical consideration.114Although would-be tax-avoiders claim that a 35 
narrower interpretation of the provision would protect the interest in 
certainty for the general body of taxpayers who do not engage in tax 
                                                     
112 BNZ Investments, above n 74, at [40].  
113 BNZ Investments, above n 74, at [91]. 
114 Challenge (PC), above n 75, at 560. 
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avoidance, Lord Templeman considered that this argument lost force once it 
was accepted that there are discernable distinctions between a transaction 
which mitigates tax and one that avoids tax.115 In Ben Nevis the majority 
rejected the taxpayer’s argument to interpret the GAAR in a way which gave 
the taxpayer reasonable certainty in tax planning. The majority said that 5 
Parliament had left the provision deliberately general. It was not for the 
courts to provide greater certainty than Parliament had chosen to provide.116   
The enactment of a GAAR is to some extent contradictory with the value 
certainty because of the fact that it is designed to cover transactions that 
Parliament has not considered. Further, the Supreme Court refused to lay 10 
down its own test for tax avoidance that gave greater certainty by providing, 
for example, a specific closed list of what behaviour would amount to tax 
avoidance. This means that to the extent that pleas for commercial certainty 
are invoked to limit the scope of the GAAR, following Ben Nevis, these pleas 
have been rejected. The result is that the hypothesis that judges have been 15 
influenced by the underlying principle that taxpayers are entitled to structure 
their affairs to lower the amount of tax that they must pay, because of the 
fact that this is what underlies pleas for commercial certainty, can no longer 
be substantiated. 
D The Scope of the GAAR Must Be Ascertained through Looking at the 20 
Relationship Between the GAAR and the Rest of the Act. 
The final approach that the court has taken when it is deciding whether the 
GAAR should apply in a given situation is to look at the relationship between 
the GAAR and other sections of the Act. This was the basis of what has 
become known as the scheme and purpose approach that was laid down by 25 
Richardson J in Challenge. The majority of the Supreme Court in Ben Nevis 
also reached its decision based on the GAAR’s relationship to other sections. 
In Challenge Richardson J said that the avoidance provision lived in an 
uneasy compromise with other provisions of the legislation. Reconciling the 
provisions must depend upon an assessment of the respective roles of the 30 
particular provision relied upon to gain a tax advantage and the avoidance 
provision as well as the relationship between them. He considered that this 
process of reconciling the provisions was a matter of statutory construction. 
Section 5 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924
117
 mandated that the meaning 
of a provision was ascertained by looking at the scheme and the relevant 35 
objectives of the legislation.118 Richardson J described the scheme and 
                                                     
115 Challenge (PC), above n 75, at 560. 
116 Ben Nevis, above n 4, at [112]. 
117 Now replaced by the Interpretation Act 1999. 
118 Challenge (CA), above n 75, at 549. 
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purpose of the legislation as the twin pillars of statutory construction.
119
 
Richardson J eventually reconciled the avoidance provision and the relevant 
particular provision by reading down the scope of the avoidance provision. 
On appeal, the Privy Council disagreed with Richardson J’s assessment of 
the scope of the avoidance provision, but nevertheless endorsed his view that 5 
the section would be a dead letter if it were subordinate to all of the specific 
provisions of the Act. This would be the case, Lord Templeman said, if 
mechanical or meticulous compliance with another section of the Act were 
sufficient to prevent the application of the avoidance provision.
120
  
After discussing the differing approaches to the avoidance provision in 10 
Challenge, the majority in Ben Nevis briefly surveyed the subsequent case 
law, concluding that this case law had proceeded, albeit sometimes 
implicitly, on the basis of the scheme and purpose approach.121 However, the 
majority noted that in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Auckland Harbour 
Board, the Privy Council seemed to have placed significantly less emphasis 15 
on the GAAR by indicating that it might only be a long stop, or backup 
provision, for the Commissioner. As a result of the uncertainty arising from 
the approach in Auckland Harbour Board the Supreme Court considered it 
desirable for it to settle the appropriate approach to the relationship between 
this provision and the rest of the Act.122 The majority considered that 20 
Parliament’s overall purpose was best served by construing specific tax 
provisions and the general-anti avoidance provision so as to give effect to 
each. Neither of these provisions should be thought of as overriding, rather 
they should work together.123 Like Richardson J, the majority also thought 
that the avoidance and specific provisions had conflicting purposes and 25 
policies. The general anti-avoidance provision is meant to be the principal 
vehicle for tax avoidance to be addressed, while each specific provision has 
its own specific meaning which had to be distinguished from that of the 
avoidance provision.124 Bearing these factors in mind, the court laid down 
the parliamentary contemplation test already discussed.  30 
These two cases demonstrate that ascertaining the relationship between 
different sections of the Income Tax Act was an important part of the 
process of working out the appropriate scope of s BG 1. However, there is 
nothing in this approach that embodies either of the two identified 
Dworkinian principles. Rather, as the Supreme Court said, this was the court 35 
                                                     
119 Challenge (CA), above n 75, at 594. 
120 Challenge (PC), above n 75, at 559. 
121 Ben Nevis, above n 4, at [95] – [96]. 
122 At [100]. 
123 At [103].  
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engaging in a process of statutory interpretation to ensure that it gave 
sufficient weight to both of the sections involved in the case. 
This means that what is left after the Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
above arguments is the parliamentary contemplation test. As noted above, 
like the argument that the scope of the GAAR must be ascertained through 5 
looking at its interpretation with the rest of the Act, this test was the result of 
a process of statutory interpretation. The finding that the scope of the GAAR 
must be ascertained by looking at whether the specific provision was used in 
a manner consistent with parliament’s contemplation was not the result of 
the application of principles. 10 
However, the parliamentary contemplation test is consistent with the first 
principle that tax should apply to cases that are economically similar. This is 
because the Parliamentary contemplation test focuses on artificial and 
contrived use of the specific provision. That is, it looks for factors such as 
artificiality and contrivance that would indicate a lack of economic 15 
substance in the transaction. These factors would indicate that the 
arrangement in reality is not economically similar to other transactions 
which were intended to come within the scope of the specific provision and 
so should not gain the same tax advantages as these transactions. 
The parliamentary contemplation test is not consistent with the second 20 
principle that taxpayers may structure their affairs so as to pay no more tax 
than the law requires. If the ability to structure affairs only extends to 
structuring them in the manner consistent with Parliament’s purpose, then 
really this principle has no force. The entitlement to arrange affairs to pay as 
little tax as possible is seriously curtailed by the parliamentary 25 
contemplation test. Therefore, the principle is not a legitimate way to guide 
interpretation of this test and must be rejected. 
VI The Role of Principles in Ascertaining Parliament’s 
Contemplation 
The foregoing discussion of recurring arguments in tax avoidance cases has 30 
resulted in the conclusion that although cases decided prior to Ben Nevis 
endorse arguments that embrace the principle that taxpayers are entitled to 
structure their affairs so as to pay as little tax as possible, the interpretation 
of these arguments in Ben Nevis has resulted in this principle being of no 
practical use in guiding judicial application of the GAAR. However, the 35 
parliamentary contemplation test is consistent with the first principle, that 
transactions should be taxed in the same way as others that are economically 
similar. Although the articulation of the test was not the result of the 
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application of principles, this section of the paper will assess whether its 
application either by the court in Ben Nevis itself, or in subsequent cases, can 
be seen as having been guided by the first identified principle.  
A The Application of the Parliamentary Contemplation Test in Ben Nevis 
The most important features of the parliamentary contemplation test were 5 
laid out in the second section of this essay. To recap, the Supreme Court 
directed that the court was to look at the purpose of the specific provision 
and the intended scope of that provision in the overall scheme of the Act. If 
the transaction in the case used the specific provision in a manner outside of 
the intended scope, then it would amount to tax avoidance. Artificiality and 10 
contrivance were identified as classic indicators of use outside of 
Parliament’s contemplation.  
Ben Nevis involved a forestry venture. In 1997, the taxpayers were 
granted a licence to occupy a block of land owned by Trinity and maintain a 
forest of fir trees. The license was for 50 years because the fir trees were not 15 
due to be harvested until 2048. In return for the licence, the taxpayers agreed 
to pay Trinity a licence premium which was payable in 2048. The result of 
this was that the expense was not payable for 50 years. However, the 
taxpayers purported to pay this immediately by issuing a promissory note for 
the amount of the premium. Insurance was also taken out in the event that 20 
the harvesting of the fir trees did not cover the licence fee. The taxpayers 
then claimed deductions for the insurance premiums under s DL 1 of the Act 
and the licence premiums under s EG 1 of the Act. In 1997 they claimed 
deductions of $34,098 per plantable hectare for the insurance premiums and 
a small proportion of the licence premium of $2,050,518 per plantable 25 
hectare as a depreciation allowance. In 1998 the taxpayers claimed about 
$41,500 per plantable hectare. In reality, the actual cost to the taxpayers was 
about $5,000 per plantable hectare in 1997 and only $50 per plantable 
hectare in 1998.125 The point of the venture was to enable the taxpayers to 
offset the claimed losses of $41,500 per year against their other income.126  30 
The majority of the Supreme Court held that the licence premium relied 
on by the taxpayer to claim the deduction was a licence premium because it 
was payable for a right to use land, as the statute required. However, the 
court considered that specific features of its use in the case, such as the 
method and timing of the arrangement meant that in reality the commitment 35 
to make the payment of the premium was illusory. The court held that in 
                                                     
125 Ben Nevis, above n 4, at [14]- [31]. 
126 See Michael Littlewood “Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd and Others v CIR; 
Glenharrow Lds v CIR – New Zealand’s new Supreme Court and Tax Avoidance [2009] 
BTR 169 at 169. 
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these circumstances claiming a deduction for the premium amounted to use 
of the deduction provision outside of its intended scope and transformed the 
arrangement into a tax avoidance arrangement.127 The taxpayers would get 
the immediate benefit of the deduction, but probably never incur the real 
expenditure.128 In relation to the insurance aspect of the scheme the court 5 
found that the promissory note was an artificial payment implemented for 
tax purposes. The insurance company took on no real risk and this 
dimension of the scheme was artificial and contrived. This is because the 
economic effect of the payment was deferred by the promissory note for 50 
years. Further, the insurer was not an arm’s length insurer and had no ability 10 
to pay in the event that it was called upon to cover the loss.129 These factors 
led the court to conclude that neither claiming deductions for the insurance 
arrangements nor the use of the licence premiums in this case amounted to 
using s EG 1 or DL 1 of the Income Tax Act in the manner contemplated by 
Parliament.130  15 
The court’s conclusion that the use of the deduction provisions was 
beyond Parliament’s contemplation in enacting the provisions was in large 
part based on the artificial and contrived nature of the transactions. The 
taxpayers were trying to obtain the benefit of the deduction provisions for 
expenses which in economic terms they had not actually sustained. The 20 
majority’s judgment makes many references to the fact that the use of the 
provisions “cannot have been within the contemplation and purpose of 
Parliament”131 and to the fact that it could not be within Parliament’s 
purpose for a specific provision to be used in a way that allows the taxpayer 
to gain the benefit of that section in an artificial or contrived way.
132
 25 
However, the court never actually said why artificial uses of specific 
provisions must be beyond the contemplated use of those provisions. In 
other words, there is a gap in the reasoning between saying that it is 
necessary to look at parliament's intended scope of the deduction provision 
in the overall scheme of the Act and the conclusion that it cannot have been 30 
parliament's intention for the deduction provision to be used in a manner that 
gains the benefit of that provision in an artificial or contrived way. As the 
IRD Interpretation Statement on s BG 1 notes, the majority’s argument 
implicitly accepts that Parliament contemplates that provisions apply to 
transactions that correctly reflect their commercial reality and economic 35 
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129 At [147] and [148]. 
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131 At [107]. 
132 At [108]. 
  Harriet Bush 
  LAWS 516 
 
33 
 
effects.
133
  Artificiality and contrivance are only indicators that the use of a 
specific provision was beyond what Parliament intended if Parliament 
intended that specific provisions are applied to transactions in a manner that 
reflects their economic reality rather than their legal form. 
The majority’s decision in Ben Nevis can therefore be seen as having been 5 
influenced by the underlying principle that tax should apply uniformly to all 
cases that are economically similar. This is because of the reliance that the 
court puts on the concepts of artificiality and contrivance without explaining 
why these factors will result in the transaction being outside of Parliament’s 
contemplation. The implicit acceptance of the idea that Parliament 10 
contemplates that provisions apply to transactions that correctly reflect their 
commercial reality embraces the substance over form approach to questions 
of tax avoidance and the principle underlying this approach that transactions 
should be taxed in the same manner as other transactions that are 
economically similar.  15 
 
B Had Artificiality and Contrivance Previously Been Held to Be Signs of 
Tax Avoidance? 
As has been pointed out above, there is a gap in reasoning between saying 
that it is important to work out what Parliament’s intention was when 20 
enacting a specific provision and that factors such as artificiality and 
contrivance indicate that a scheme would not have been within Parliament’s 
contemplation. One way that the gap could be filled, is if previous tax 
avoidance decisions had specifically found these factors to be features of tax 
avoidance arrangements.  25 
References to the relevance of artificiality and contrivance as indicators 
of tax avoidance can be found in a number of decisions.134 For example, the 
Court of Appeal described the transaction in Dandelion Investments Ltd as 
an artifice involving pretence. The court considered that it was not a real 
group transaction at all and amounted to tax avoidance.135 In Commissioner 30 
of Inland Revenue v BNZ Investments, the majority said that what should be 
struck at by the avoidance provision were artifices and arrangements which 
had tax induced features outside the range of acceptable practices.136  
                                                     
133 Public Rulings Unit Interpretation Statement: Tax Avoidance and the Interpretation of 
sections BG 1 and GA 1 of the Income Tax Act 2007 (Inland Revenue Department, 
Wellington, 2013) at [309]. 
134 Miller, above n 24, at [10]; Dandelion Investments Ltd v CIR [2003] 1 NZLR 600 (CA) 
at [85] and CIR v BNZ Investments Ltd [2002] 1 NZLR 450 (CA) at [40], [97] and [108]. 
135 Dandelion Investments, above n 134, at [85].  
136 BNZ Investments, above n 134, at [40]. 
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  Similarly, in Challenge Lord Templemann defined tax avoidance as 
when a taxpayer reduces his liability to tax without involving himself in the 
loss or expenditure which entitles him to that reduction.137 This definition 
embraces consideration of the substance of the transaction. 
The above cases show that the Supreme Court’s proposition that 5 
artificiality, contrivance and lack of economic reality are often hallmarks of 
tax avoidance was not new; rather it was the majority linking these features 
to use of a specific provision in a way that was beyond the contemplation of 
Parliament that involved reasoning that was not expressed clearly in the 
judgement itself.  This leap in reasoning provides support for the proposition 10 
that the court was influenced by and endorsed the first discussed principle.  
C The Application of the Parliamentary Contemplation Test Post-Ben Nevis 
Cases decided after Ben Nevis have applied the parliamentary contemplation 
test and are therefore also consistent with the principle that tax should apply 
uniformly in all cases that are economically similar. However, these cases 15 
made more obvious attempts to ascertain what Parliament’s purpose in 
enacting the specific provision was than the court in Ben Nevis itself by 
analysing why transactions lacking economic substance were not intended to 
come within the scope of a specific provision. Drawing from these cases in 
the Inland Revenue Interpretative Statement on s BG 1, the Department said 20 
that purpose could be identified through considering the meaning of the text 
of the relevant provision, the context, including the statutory scheme, and 
any relevant legislative history.138 In Ben Nevis the Supreme Court said that 
the proper approach was to look at was the intention of Parliament “when it 
enacted the provision.”139 Subsequently applying this test in BNZ 25 
Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (No 2) Wild J agreed 
that this was a hypothetical task where the court essentially had to ask itself: 
had Parliament foreseen transactions of this type when enacting the specific 
provision deployed in the transactions, would it have viewed them within the 
scheme and purpose of those specific provisions?140 30 
BNZ Investments (No 2) provides an example of the court engaging in a 
more thorough analysis of the purpose of the specific provision at issue. This 
case involved the conduit companies’ regime. The judge looked at a 
discussion document when discussing the purposes of this policy but 
determined Parliament’s purpose primarily by reference to the scheme of the 35 
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Act. He concluded that the specific requirements for conduit companies in 
the Act would be pointless unless Parliament was contemplating that some 
of the conduit relieved income would be passed on to the foreign owner.141 
As this had not happened on the facts of this case, the provision had not been 
used in a manner consistent with Parliament’s purpose. This is therefore an 5 
example of a case where Parliament’s purpose could be ascertained by a 
process of statutory interpretation.  
Another case that demonstrates the court engaging in a more thorough 
analysis of Parliament’s purpose is the Court of Appeal’s decision in Alesco. 
The court considered that the meaning, purpose and effect of the financial 10 
arrangements rules were at the heart of the case.142 The court said that the 
primary issue was whether, if Alesco New Zealand did not incur either a 
legal liability to pay interest or any economic cost on the loan from its 
Australian owner, its use of the financial arrangement rules and s G22 to 
claim income tax deductions for expenditure incurred fell outside of 15 
Parliament’s contemplation when enacting the rules.143 The court looked 
first at whether the purpose or intended scope of the financial arrangement 
rules relied on to claim the interest deductions. It set out these statutory 
provisions, including the purpose stated in the Act, and analysed the 
language used in each provision. The court then looked to secondary 20 
literature that discussed the principal aims of the financial arrangements 
rules, and previous cases that had analysed the purpose of these rules.
144
 
After discussing these materials the court considered that the financial 
arrangements rules were intended to give effect to real economic benefits 
and costs. The court therefore reached the conclusion that Parliament did not 25 
intend that a taxpayer would be entitled to use the financial arrangement 
rules as a basis for claiming deductions for interest for which the taxpayer 
was not liable or did not pay.145 It considered that this was consistent with 
the decision in Ben Nevis that the underlying premise for statutory 
deductibility rules is that they apply only when real economic consequences 30 
are incurred.146   
The decision in Alesco embraces the principle that transactions should be 
taxed in the same manner as other transactions that are economically similar. 
Following the approach in Ben Nevis, the court in Alesco took a substance 
over form approach and looked at the economic reality of the transactions. 35 
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However, before adopting this principle the Court of Appeal looked at why 
the principle was appropriate in the specific statutory context of the financial 
arrangements rules by analysing why Parliament’s purpose was that real 
economic loss was sustained. The result of this is that the use of the principle 
was explicitly tied to a process of statutory interpretation, rather than 5 
implicitly accepted by the court. This means that although the first principle 
is embodied by the decision that there was tax avoidance, there is no 
evidence that the court’s reasoning included reference to the principle. 
Because the purpose of the financial arrangements rules was clearly 
ascertainable, whether there was tax avoidance was decided by a process of 10 
statutory interpretation. The decision in Alesco demonstrates that the 
parliamentary contemplation approach may be applied through a process of 
statutory construction.  That is, applying the parliamentary contemplation 
test does not always require relying on the underlying principle. Alesco 
therefore supports Hart’s theory that it is only in hard cases that judges have 15 
the ability to reach their decision by recourse to principles. In this case the 
intended scope of the specific provisions was clearly expressed, so the case 
was not a hard case.  
VII Parliament’s Contemplation: Should Principles Help? 
This paper has sought to assess whether judicial application of s BG 1 20 
supports the hypotheses that judges use principles when reaching decisions. 
Based on extrajudicial writing on the subject, it has adopted the view that 
there is room for the application of principles, but only in some cases, when 
it is uncertain how the law should apply. Following the Supreme Court’s 
approach to the avoidance provision in Ben Nevis, hard case will arise when 25 
parliament’s intended scope of the specific provision used to gain a tax 
advantage is unclear. Where this is the case, it is possible for judges to 
assess whether s BG 1 should apply based on the underlying principle that 
tax should apply uniformly to all cases that are economically similar. 
Despite the fact that the court in Ben Nevis may have been able to establish 30 
the intended scope of the specific provisions explicitly by looking at factors 
such as the legislative history of the provisions, the court did not do this. 
Instead, it based its analysis on factors that would indicate that the use could 
not have been within Parliament’s purpose when it enacted the relevant 
provisions. In the absence of this explicit analysis of what Parliament’s 35 
intention for the scope of the specific provision was, the judgment can be 
seen as an example of the court being influenced by a Dworkinian principle 
in reaching its decision. The final section of the essay will assess whether it 
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is appropriate for judges to decide hard cases concerning s BG 1 in this 
manner.  
A A Jurisprudential Approach 
Approaching this question with reference to the arguments of each of the 
jurisprudential theories gives a different answer. Dworkin would argue that 5 
not only should judges decide hard cases by reference to principles, but that 
they are legally obliged to decide such cases in this way.147 Hart, on the 
other hand, does not make a judgment about whether it is desirable for 
judges to decide by reference to principles or not. Critical legal scholars 
would view the use of principles negatively as an example of the exercise of 10 
judicial discretion.148 Yet it is interesting that applying the GAAR according 
to this principle will arguably lead to a more expansive scope for the GAAR 
than saying that the section cannot apply because the scope of the specific 
provision is unclear. Because tax avoidance is often carried out by the 
wealthy or elite,149 the GAAR is a tool to stop the elite taking advantage of 15 
the legal structure for their own benefit. Applying the GAAR according to the 
first identified principle is therefore in line with critical legal scholars’ aim.  
The criticism of using principles in judicial reasoning often stems from 
the fact that courts do not explicitly say that this is what they are doing. If 
transparency in judicial decision-making is what is desired, then deciding 20 
according to principle should be acceptable as long as judges are clear that 
this is what is guiding their application of the GAAR. 
B The Argument against Reliance on the First Principle 
One argument against the use of the principle stems from the use of the 
parliamentary contemplation test to determine the GAAR’s scope in the first 25 
place. The wording of the GAAR only makes sense when read in conjunction 
with the rest of the Act. This means that relying on this underlying principle 
when the intended scope of the specific provision is unclear would in effect 
result in widening the GAAR's application and making this section the 
primary section of the Act. Because the GAAR itself must be understood 30 
through its interaction with other sections of the Act, then relying upon a 
principle, when this interaction is unclear, and in isolation from this wider 
context, is inappropriate. This is because the principle that tax should apply 
uniformly to all cases that are economically similar is broad and 
unconstrained. Unless the scope of the specific provision is also influenced 35 
                                                     
147 Dworkin Law’s Empire, above n 6, at 253. 
148 See for example Kress, above n 18. 
149 This is because wealthy taxpayers are the people with both the ability and the incentive 
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by this principle, then using it to guide the application of the GAAR in hard 
cases will arguably lead to the GAAR having a wider application in these 
cases than in cases when the scope of the specific provision is clear. Further, 
it has been argued that where Parliament's intention is inadequately 
expressed, and the intended scope of the specific provision is not known, 5 
then it is not for the courts to use the GAAR to perfect the inadequate 
expression of Parliament's intention. Rather the courts must leave it up to 
Parliament to legislate if it wishes to fix the imperfections of the statute.150 
C The Argument in Favour of Reliance on the First Principle 
On the other hand, strong support for the use of the principle to guide the 10 
application of the GAAR is provided by looking at the intended purpose of 
the avoidance provision itself. It is generally accepted that one tool for 
ascertaining Parliament’s purpose in enacting a specific provision is to look 
at the legislative history of an Act.151 In this case, the GAAR was amended in 
1975 to a form much like it is today. The speech given during parliamentary 15 
debate on the Bill by the Minister of Justice at the time, the Hon Dr AM 
Finlay MP, provides insight about the objective of the amendment. Dr Finlay 
noted two results of amending the GAAR to give it the force to be used as a 
tool to ensure that people paid tax as Parliament intended. The first was that 
the tax burden would be more equitably shared, resulting in a lightening of 20 
the burden for the ordinary taxpayer.152 The second was that tax legislation 
could be simplified.153 
In this speech Dr Finlay also cited the dicta of several judgments as 
examples of differing approaches to tax avoidance. He noted the House of 
Lords’ decision in Latilla v Inland Revenue Commisioner154 where their 25 
Lordships said that one result of tax avoidance arrangements was to 
increase:155 
 pro tanto the load of tax on the shoulders of the great 
body of good citizens who do not desire, or do not know 
how, or… cannot afford to adopt [such] manoeuvres. 30 
He also described the decision in the case of Elmiger and Another v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue as a landmark decision.156 At first 
instance, Woodhouse J had noted that tax avoidance arrangements were 
sterile and unproductive and had consequences contrary to the general 
                                                     
150 Trombitas, above n 37, at 594. 
151 See for example Barak, above n 4, at 342- 350.  
152(30 August 1974) 393 NZPD 4192. 
153 At 4192. 
154 Latilla v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1943] AC 377 (HL). 
155 At 4192. 
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public interest.
157
 This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.
158
 
Finally, he said that:159 
If people choose to avoid paying tax by disposing of their 
income in a way that is totally different form the normal 
patterns of ordinary folks’ spending… it should be 5 
treated as it really is- as a device to avoid bearing their 
share of the costs of running the community. 
Dr Finlay’s comments are directly in line with the principle that tax 
should apply uniformly to cases that are economically similar. His 
comments suggest that tax avoidance is something that can only be engaged 10 
in by wealthy taxpayers, and results in them paying an amount of tax that 
does not reflect their actual income and so distorts the equity of the tax 
system.  
The legislative history of the anti-avoidance provision therefore 
demonstrates that Parliament’s intention for the GAAR is consistent with and 15 
embodies the reasoning behind the first principle identified in this essay. 
The GAAR was enacted to ensure that the integrity of the tax system was 
maintained through transactions that were economically similar being 
treated the same way for tax purposes. This might suggest that when what is 
within Parliament’s contemplation or intention in enacting the specific 20 
provision relied upon to gain a tax advantage is not easily ascertained, and 
the case therefore amounts to a hard case, it would be appropriate for the 
court to be guided by this principle in deciding whether or not to apply the 
GAAR.  
Although the parliamentary contemplation test looks at Parliament's 25 
intention in enacting the specific provision, it does not look at Parliament's 
intention when enacting the GAAR. However, an examination of the 
legislative history of the avoidance provision has found that Parliament's 
intention for the GAAR was consistent with the principle that tax should 
apply uniformly to all cases that are economically similar. Given that the 30 
whole interpretative exercise is to work out whether the GAAR should apply, 
and that the GAAR embodies this first principle, then in hard cases where the 
scope of the relevant specific provision relied on is uncertain, this principle 
should guide interpretation. The purpose of the avoidance provision itself is 
consistent with the first principle. If it is not possible to rely upon this 35 
principle when the scope of the provision that would otherwise be used to 
determine the appropriate scope of the GAAR in the particular context of the 
                                                     
157 Elmiger and Another v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1966] NZLR 683 (SC) at 687. 
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case is not clear, then the avoidance provision would be given less emphasis 
than other provisions of the Act. Applying the first principle in cases where 
the scope of the specific provision relied upon is uncertain allows the court 
to make reasonable assumptions about Parliament’s intention for specific 
provisions, in the context of an Income Tax Act which has a general anti-5 
avoidance rule specifically incorporating this principle.  
In the Supreme Court’s decision in Ben Nevis, the majority set out a list 
of factors that would be important to look at when the court was assessing 
whether there was tax avoidance. The focus on these factors is consistent 
with the first principle identified in this essay, as they point to the existence 10 
of a transaction that is not economically similar to those to which it is 
purporting to be taxed in the same way. This indicates that where the 
purpose of a specific provision is not easily discernible, and the decision is a 
hard case, the court may rely on the factors identified by the Supreme Court 
and based on the first identified principle. As Elliffe and Cameron put it:160 15 
Parliament’s purpose in enacting specific provisions is 
axiomatically targeted at the most commonplace and 
conventional issues which arise, anything that indicates 
an unusual or contrived application of a provision is also 
likely to indicate that the provision was not used in the 20 
way Parliament thought it would be. If enough of these 
abnormalities are present, and are also accompanied by 
tax advantages, then it is a fair conclusion that the use is 
outside Parliamentary contemplation. 
VIII Conclusion 25 
Jurisprudential scholars seek to provide a theory of law that best reflects the 
reality of the legal system. Part of this must include a hypothesis about how 
judges reach decisions in cases. The best way to evaluate the strength of 
each jurisprudential approach to decision-making is by applying the theory 
to cases and assessing whether the theory reflects what seems to have 30 
happened in that case. This essay has analysed whether HLA Hart, Ronald 
Dworkin, or critical legal theorists provide a better theory of how cases are 
decided in an area of law that is notoriously difficult and uncertain; that is, 
the application of the general anti-avoidance rule in s BG 1 of the Income 
Tax Act 2007. Specifically, this essay has sought to assess whether judicial 35 
decision-making in this area is influenced by moral principles.  
                                                     
160 Craig Elliffe and Jess Cameron “The Test for Tax Avoidance in New Zealand: A 
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On the basis of the extra-judicial writings of several Australian and New 
Zealand judges, the paper adopted the view that judges may appeal to 
principles as part of their reasoning, but that this would only occur in certain 
hard cases. After laying out s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act, the paper then 
identified two possible principles that could be important in tax avoidance 5 
cases. The two principles identified were the principle that tax should 
applying uniformly to cases that are economically similar and the principle 
that taxpayers are entitled to structure their affairs to pay no more tax than 
the law requires.  
The next section of the essay sought to apply these principles to the 10 
existing precedent on the avoidance section to try and discern whether any 
of the precedent had been influenced by the principles. Following the 
parliamentary contemplation test that the Supreme Court laid down for tax 
avoidance in Ben Nevis, the paper determined that judges have the ability to 
apply principles in cases where the intended scope of a specific provision of 15 
the Income Tax Act is not clear. Although cases decided prior to this 
decision seemed to embrace the second identified principle, the 
parliamentary contemplation test is consistent with the first principle; that 
tax should apply uniformly to all cases that are economically similar.  The 
Supreme Court's decision in this case can be seen as having been influenced 20 
by this principle, because of the gaps in the court’s reasoning when laying 
out this test. However, several of the cases subsequently decided show the 
court engaging in a more thorough analysis of what was within Parliament's 
contemplation when it enacted the specific provision. These cases therefore 
support the conclusion reached on the basis of extrajudicial writing, that 25 
judges only apply principles in hard cases. The essay concluded that 
reliance on the first principle in hard cases is justified because of the 
purpose of the general anti-avoidance rule.  
The evidence of judicial reasoning as shown by New Zealand tax 
avoidance jurisprudence therefore most strongly supports Hart's theory of 30 
judicial decision-making. The judicial application of s BG 1 demonstrates 
that although judges may rely on moral principles when deciding some 
cases, the use of these principles is neither as prevalent as critical legal 
theories would indicate or as central to judicial reasoning as Dworkin’s 
theory claims.  35 
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